This paper examines the warrant price reaction and stock price reaction to the announcement of a discretionary reduction in warrant exercise price. The firms making these announcements are small and young. They derive much of their value from growth opportunities, exhibit high levels of information asymmetry, and are experiencing poor operating performance.
Introduction
In recent years, the finance profession has become interested in the characteristics of securities issued by corporations and the economic logic underlying the choice of characteristics.
For example, Barclay and Smith (1995a) and Guedes and Opler (1996) address the maturity of debt issues; Barclay and Smith (1995b) study the priority structure of debt; Johnson (1997) investigates the choice between private and public debt; Carey, Post, and Sharpe (1998) analyze the distinction between lending by banks and lending by finance companies; and Mayers (1998) and Stein (1992) examine the rationale for using convertible debt. Anderson (1999) examines the provisions found in Brazilian bond indentures.
Warrant agreements, analogous to bond indentures, often contain option-like provisions that increase the control that managers have over financing decisions. Several of these provisions have been studied in the extant literature. Callability at a nominal price is one feature, typically used to force conversion. Schultz (1993b) empirically examines conversion-forcing calls of warrants and concludes that warrants are called optimally. He reports an initial 3 percent decline in stock price in response to the call announcement, followed by a more-than-offsetting rebound in price. Extendability is another option-like warrant characteristic, allowing managers to extend the life of a warrant issue. Howe and Wei (1993) report that warrants increase in value in response to extension announcements, and that stock prices also respond positively to the announcement.
The purpose of this paper is to examine another common feature of warrant agreements: managerial discretion to reduce warrant exercise price. Practitioners sometimes refer to this as "sweetening the warrant." Our empirical investigation examines the warrant price reaction and stock price reaction to the announcement of a reduction of warrant exercise price. We then seek to explain the cross-sectional variation in the stock price reaction to this event. We also document the failure rates and long-term performance of the sample firms to determine whether the funds raised via warrant exercise are squandered, as suggested by the agency-cost explanation for the issuance of warrants.
This research is important for at least two reasons. First, the decision to reduce the exercise price of a warrant is a financing decision that has not been examined. The characteristics of the sample firms suggest that they would have difficulty directly accessing the capital markets.
For example, they are small and young. They derive much of their value from growth opportunities, exhibit high levels of information asymmetry, and are experiencing poor operating performance. The option to lower the exercise price of an issue of warrants allows these firms to raise capital without being subject to the direct monitoring of capital providers (Easterbrook, 1984) . The market reaction to this event provides evidence about the efficacy of this feature of the warrant agreement.
Second, Schultz (1993a) argues that warrants are part of a staged financing process intended to reduce agency costs associated with free cash flow, analogous to sequential financing by venture capital firms. As discussed in the venture capital literature (e.g., Sahlman, 1990) , this 3 sequencing of cash infusions is a response to agency costs associated with free cash flows (Jensen, 1986) . The option to accelerate the sale of new shares by reducing the exercise price may compromise the efficacy of warrants in controlling agency costs. In this context, a provision that allows managers to lower the exercise price is undesirable. If the market perceives the presence of substantial manager-shareholder conflict, we would expect a relatively large stock price decline in response to the announcement. In contrast, if investors view the event as a solution to the firm's cash flow problems, we may see only a mild stock price reaction. Thus, this research provides an indirect test of the agency-cost explanation for the use of warrants.
Our evidence suggests that managerial discretion to lower the exercise price is an efficient provision of the warrant agreement. Specifically, the average two-day stock price reaction (cumulative abnormal return) to the reduction announcement is -1.33 percent, which is smaller in magnitude than the reaction documented for seasoned equity offerings. Indeed, there is a marginally positive stock price reaction to announcements that provide information about the planned use of the proceeds arising from warrant exercise. Further, the sample firms do not fail at a higher rate than a sample of control firms and they significantly outperform their controls over a three-year period; we interpret these findings as evidence that the proceeds from warrant exercise are not squandered. Overall, the evidence suggests, first, that there are not material conflicts between shareholders and warrantholders, and, second, that the costs of potential shareholder-manager agency conflict are outweighed by the benefits of managerial flexibility. 1 2 Typical is this example from the Warrant Agreement of Sunshine Mining Company, dated February 3, 1994: "The Company may at its option, but shall not be obligated to, at any time during the term of the Warrants provided for in subsection 6.1 hereof, decrease the then current Exercise Price by any amount selected by the Board; provided, that if the Company elects so to decrease the then current Exercise Price, such decrease shall be irrevocable during its effective period and remain in effect for a minimum of 20 business days following the date of such election, after which time the Company may, at its option, reinstate the Exercise Price in effect prior to such decrease." (italics in original) 4 The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the empirical tests, and Section 3 describes the data and methods of analysis. Section 4 presents the findings. A summary and our conclusions appear in Section 5.
Empirical tests
The first empirical test focuses on the price reaction of the warrants to the announcement of a reduction of exercise price. These announcements are partially anticipated because the option to reduce the exercise price is explicit in the warrant agreement.
2 The announcement resolves the uncertainty associated with the possibility of an exercise price reduction, as well as uncertainty about what the new exercise price will be. The warrant price reaction reflects the information about the new exercise price as well as the market's understanding that the probability of an exercise price reduction has become 100 percent. According to option pricing theory (and common sense), a reduction of the exercise price will increase warrant value, all else equal. Hence, we expect the warrants to increase in value at the announcement.
The second test examines the stock price reaction to the reduction-of-exercise-price announcement. The stock price reaction could be positive, negative, or zero. The announcement may represent good news for shareholders if it means that the firm will invest the cash inflow in a positive net present value (NPV) project that it would otherwise forego. The announcement may 3 Some of the permanent reductions occur near the end of the life of the warrant, and thus may be, in some sense, temporary rather than permanent. To check this conjecture, we first compute the median duration of the temporary reductions (0.13 years). We then reclassify those permanent reductions that involve a remaining warrant life of less than 0.13 years as temporary, and re-run the tests. The results, not reported, are qualitatively unchanged. 5 represent bad news for several reasons: (i) the sale of new shares may signal negative information (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984) ; and (ii) the sale of new shares may create an agency conflict, in which the firm's managers squander the cash inflow (Schultz, 1993a) . The observed stock price reaction represents the net effect of good news and bad news, and could thus be zero.
Reductions in warrant exercise price may be temporary, as in the case cited at the beginning of this paper, or permanent. An example of the latter is:
American Complex Care Inc. Friday announced that its board of directors has unanimously approved a reduction in the exercise price of the company's publicly traded common stock purchase warrant to $2.25 per share. . . .The previous exercise price was $5.00 per share.
Throughout the paper, we report results for the combined sample, as well as the temporary and permanent reduction subsamples. 3 We also divide the sample according to whether the announcement contains information about the planned use of the proceeds from the exercise of the warrants.
In addition to these partitions, the research examines other potential determinants of cross-sectional variation in stock price reaction: residual standard deviation (a proxy for information asymmetry); market-to-book ratio (a proxy for growth opportunities); firm size; a measure of the magnitude of the cash flow from warrant exercise; and the percent reduction in exercise price. These variables and their rationales are more fully described in the next section. 
Data and method of analysis
For the period January 1980 through January 1997, we searched the Dow Jones News
Retrieval service for announcements of reductions in exercise prices using the key works "warrant," "common stock purchase warrant," and "exercise price." The initial sample consisted of 440 observations. We eliminated 71 of these that represented anti-dilutive adjustments, and For each of the 267 announcements, we searched the S&P Daily Stock Price Record for data about the warrants. We were able to locate data for 140 warrants whose exercise price was lowered, and these constitute the warrant sample.
We also construct a control stock sample matched on industry (two-digit SIC code) and size (market value of equity). We use accounting data from Compustat to construct descriptive statistics for the sample firms and their controls.
We conduct two event studies that examine the warrant price reaction and stock price reaction to the reduction announcements. For the warrants, we report average (raw) returns for an interval centered on the announcement day, and test for significance using a cross-sectional 7 t-test. We use unadjusted returns because we do not have a well-accepted model of "normal" returns for warrants, but the daily normal return should be close to zero.
For the stocks, we rely on standard event-study procedures to calculate the abnormal returns. The estimation period starts 120 days before the announcement and ends 10 days before the announcement. The CRSP Nasdaq index serves as the market proxy. 4 The significance of the abnormal returns is assessed using the Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) standardized cross-sectional t-statistic.
Cross-sectional variation in stock price response is examined in three ways. First, as noted above, we divide the sample by temporary and permanent exercise price reductions. Second, we partition the sample according to whether the announcement contains information about the use of the exercise proceeds.
Third, we calculate the correlations of the stock price reaction (two-day cumulative abnormal return) with five explanatory variables, and then estimate two multiple regression models with stock price reaction as the dependent variable. The five explanatory variables are as follows. The standard deviation of the market model residuals (RSD) from the estimation period is a proxy for information asymmetry (Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam, 1999) . We conjecture that greater levels of information asymmetry are associated with greater costs of accessing the capital market. The ability to raise funds via warrant exercise is valuable because it does not involve direct access to the capital market; hence, the coefficient on RSD is predicted to be positive. Market-to-book (MTOB) is a measure of growth opportunities. A firm with better 8 growth opportunities ought to experience a less negative reaction to the announcement; we thus posit a positive coefficient on MTOB. The market value of equity is an alternative proxy for information asymmetry, and thus the expected sign on EQUITY is positive. We measure the magnitude of the financing as the dollar inflow from warrant exercise as a percent of the firm's market value of equity (%INFLOW). We expect that a larger equity infusion will lead to a more negative stock price reaction and thus that the coefficient on %INFLOW will be negative. Finally, we assess whether the percent reduction in exercise price influences the stock price reaction. If a greater reduction in exercise price constitutes a greater "giveaway" to warrantholders, we expect to observe a negative coefficient on REDUCE, where REDUCE is the percent reduction in exercise price.
Finally, we track the failure rate and long-term performance of the sample firms in comparison with the control firms. If the option to lower exercise price is used wisely, then the firms should not fail at a higher rate. In contrast, if the proceeds from the warrant exercise are squandered-as suggested by the agency-cost hypothesis of Schultz (1993a)-then the firms should fail at a greater-than-normal rate and should underperform their controls. The first row of the table shows the market value of equity, calculated as the number of shares outstanding times the price per share two days before the announcement. Five firms (all permanent reductions) lack information about the number of shares outstanding, so the sample size for the combined sample is 262. The sample firms are typically small firms, with a median market value of equity of $11.48 million, and an average market equity value of $33.04 million.
Findings

Descriptive data
We have data for all 54 of the firms announcing temporary reductions in exercise price, and their median market value is $18.64 million; the average is $22.81 million. For the 208 permanent reductions, the median market value is $10.09 million, with an average of $35.70 million. The median size for the permanent reductions is significantly less (at the 5 percent level) than the median for the temporary reductions, whereas the mean size of the permanent reductions is greater than that of the temporary reductions (although not significant at standard inference levels). Our interpretation is that there is no convincing evidence that the market value of equity is different across the two subsamples (temporary and permanent reductions).
Panel B of Table 2 contains the market value of equity for the control firms. The control firms do not differ materially from the sample firms in terms of market value of equity, confirming the efficacy of the matching procedure.
The second row of Table 2 reports the market-to-book ratio, which we use as a measure of growth opportunities. For the combined sample, the average market-to-book ratio is 4.99, with a median of 2.06. For the control firms (Panel B), these numbers are 2.18 and 1.14, respectively, and are significantly less than the market-to-book ratios of the sample firms. When the sample is broken down into temporary and permanent reductions, this pattern continues, i.e., the sample firms have significantly higher market-to-book ratios (both mean and median) than their controls. This evidence suggests that firms announcing warrant exercise price reductions are growth firms, deriving much of their value from growth opportunities rather than assets-in-place.
The third row of Operating earnings per share is a measure of performance. We compute this metric as net income before extraordinary items divided by number of shares outstanding, each taken from the year before the announcement. The sample firms have negative earnings and negative performance appears in both the temporary and permanent subsamples. In aggregate, the control firms have significantly higher earnings; this is driven by the subsample of permanent reductions.
The underperformance by the sample firms is consistent with their warrants being out of the money at the time of the announcement.
We calculate the ratio of research and development expenditures to sales as an alternative measure of growth opportunities under the assumption that higher levels of R&D are indicative of growth firms. The sixth row of Table 2 reports this ratio. On average, this ratio is nearly three 11 times as high for the sample firms when compared with the control firms (combined sample), and the difference in means is significant for the temporary and permanent reductions. The medians are always higher for the sample firms vis-à-vis their controls, but the differences are not statistically significant. Overall, this evidence provides additional support for the view that firms that reduce their warrants' exercise prices are growth firms.
Finally, the table reports the percent increase in capital expenditures in the year following the announcement, using the year of the announcement as the base. On average, the combined sample firms increase their capital expenditures by 51 percent, higher than the 25 percent average increase of the control firms, but the difference is not significant. Further, the medians are not statistically different, and differences between the temporary and permanent subsamples and their controls are not significant at conventional levels.
To summarize the data in Table 2 , the sample firms tend to be small and young, with high market-to-book ratios, relatively large R&D expenditures, and poor accounting performance.
These characteristics are consistent with Schultz's (1993a) agency-cost theory about firms that issue warrants. The firms announcing temporary reductions do not appear to be fundamentally different from the firms announcing permanent reductions.
5 Table 3 contains information about the reductions in exercise price. On average, the warrants are about 26 percent ($1.78) out of the money before the reduction. For temporary reductions, the warrants are about 13 percent ($0.77) out of the money prior to the change in exercise price on average; for permanent reductions, the warrants are nearly 30 percent ($2.03) out of the money. The differences both in percent and in dollar terms between the temporary and permanent reductions are statistically significant.
After the reduction in exercise price, the warrants are, on average, 21 percent ($0.38) in the money. The temporary reduction subsample averages about 47 percent ($1.21) in the money, while the warrants in the permanent reduction subsample are about 14 percent ($0.17) in the money. Here again, the differences are statistically significant. In short, the subsample of temporary exercise price reductions involves warrants that are modestly out of the money that become significantly in the money. The subsample of permanent exercise price reductions involves warrants that are well out of the money that become modestly in the money. Table 4 presents the warrant returns around the announcement date (event day 0). On the announcement date, the average warrant return is 8.32 percent for the combined sample, which is statistically different from zero at conventional levels. On the announcement day, only about 22 percent of the warrants experience a negative return. Although no other day's average return is individually distinguishable from zero in the [-5, +5] interval, the cumulative return over this 11-day window is greater than 18 percent. We find a similar result when the sample is broken down into temporary and permanent reductions: each subsample exhibits a significant positive price reaction on the announcement day. The evidence in Table 4 leads us to conclude that warrants increase in value in response to the announcement of a reduction in exercise price.
Event studies
The stock price reaction to the announcement of a reduction in exercise price is shown in Table 5 . On the announcement day, the average abnormal return for the combined sample is 13 -1.37 percent, which is significant at the 1 percent level. Over the [-1, 0] interval, the cumulative abnormal return is -1.33 percent. Thus, stock prices decline significantly in response to the announcement. However, only about 57 (53) percent of the firms experience a negative abnormal return on day 0 (day -1). Further, the magnitude of the stock price reaction is less than that found by Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and others for announcements of seasoned equity offerings, and by Schultz (1993b) for conversion-forcing calls of warrants.
The temporary reduction subsample experiences an average abnormal return of -1.15 percent on day -1 (significant at the 1 percent level) and -0.95 percent on day 0, for a two-day The company intends to use the proceeds from the exercise of the warrants primarily for acquisitional and working capital purposes.
The company said it reduced the exercise price of its class A warrants to generate new equity capital to be used by the company towards satisfying a portion of its current bank debt obligations and to provide additional working capital to the extent proceeds are not paid to the bank.
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We divide the combined sample according to whether the announcement contains any information about the use of the proceeds. For the 31 companies that provide such information, the two-day cumulative abnormal stock return over the interval [-1, 0] is positive 1.32 percent, which is significant at the 10 percent level. For companies that provide no such information, the two-day cumulative abnormal stock return is -1.51 percent. The difference between these two subsamples is significant at the 5 percent level.
The positive warrant price reaction and negative stock price reaction represent, at least in part, a wealth transfer from stockholders to warrantholders. To assess whether the announcement also conveys new information or is purely a wealth transfer, we compute the aggregate dollar gain to warrantholders and the aggregate dollar loss to shareholders. We can find the number of warrants outstanding for only 92 of the sample firms. For these 92 firms, warrantholders gain a total of $6.59 million while shareholders lose $34.31 million, an aggregate net loss of $27.72 million. Thus, the announcement is not merely a wealth transfer, but also has negative information content, as do other types of equity financing announcements. Table 6 reports the correlation and regression results. Because the findings for the temporary and permanent reductions subsamples closely mirror those of the combined sample, our discussion focuses on the results for the combined sample. Panel A reports the correlations of 15 two-day cumulative abnormal stock return, CAR(-1,0), with the five variables described in Section 3.
Correlation and regression results
As hypothesized, the residual standard deviation (RSD) is significantly positively correlated with the stock price reaction, indicating that greater information asymmetry is associated with a less negative stock price reaction. As discussed in Section 3, a firm that has high levels of information asymmetry may have difficulty accessing the capital market. Warrant exercise is an alternative financing measure that is particularly valuable to a firm with limited capital market access.
The market-to-book ratio (MTOB) is also significantly positively correlated with the twoday cumulative abnormal stock return. Our interpretation of this finding is that a firm with better growth opportunities experiences a less negative stock price reaction, consistent with the notion that the market expects the proceeds from warrant exercise to be invested in profitable growth opportunities.
The size of the firm, measure by the market value of equity (EQUITY) is not significantly correlated with CAR(-1,0). There may not be sufficient variation in this variable across the sample firms to detect a relation, or perhaps firm size does not influence the stock price reaction.
The variable %INFLOW is calculated as the dollar inflow from warrant exercise (at the new exercise price) as a proportion of the market value of equity two days prior to the announcement. We have only 92 observations for %INFLOW because, as noted earlier, the number of warrants outstanding is unavailable for most of the sample firms. %INFLOW is negatively related to the two-day cumulative abnormal stock return. That is, a larger equity infusion is correlated with a more negative stock price reaction.
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The correlation with REDUCE is significantly negative, showing that a greater reduction in exercise price is associated with a more negative stock price reaction, perhaps indicative of a "giveaway" effect.
Panels B, C, and D of Table 6 report the regression results. The dependent variable in all cases is the cumulative abnormal stock return on the common stock over days -1 and 0. We estimate two models. Model (1) includes the five variables described above. However, the sample size for this model is small (82 for the combined sample) because the variable %INFLOW has relatively few observations. Model (2) The results are similar in Model (2). Again, the coefficient on RSD is significantly positive, the coefficient on REDUCE is significantly negative, and no other coefficient is statistically distinguishable from zero. The R 2 of this regression is 10.6 percent.
Panels C and D report the results for the temporary and permanent reductions samples.
The findings are nearly identical to those for the combined sample. The similarity of results in Panels C and D is additional evidence that the temporary and permanent reductions are not fundamentally different.
For all regressions, we compute the Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch condition index to assess the degree of multicollinearity. The maximum value for any regression was 9.1, well below the threshold value of 20.
The regression results support two conjectures. First, a firm that experiences a high degree of information asymmetry may have difficulty directly accessing the capital market. The warrant provision that allows the firm to lower a warrant's exercise price is valuable to a firm in this situation. Second, there is evidence of a "giveaway" effect; that is, a greater reduction in exercise price is associated with a greater negative stock price response.
Long-term viability
In order to assess the long-term viability of the sample firms, we track their failure rates and those of their control firms. Following Schultz (1993a), we count the number of firms delisted 1, 2, and 3 years after the announcement. For the sample firms, 19, 20, and 13 firms were delisted within 1, 2, and 3 years of the announcement. For the control firms, these numbers are 16, 21, and 21, which are not significantly different from the numbers of delistings observed in the sample firms. Also recall that the sample firms are significantly younger than the control firms. We would thus expect them to fail at a higher rate, ceteris paribus. The finding that they fail at a rate no higher than the controls is material evidence of their long-term viability. We infer that the capital received from the warrant exercise is typically invested in profitable projects, not squandered.
We also calculate the unadjusted returns of the sample and control firms over the three year period starting the month after the announcement. Using all available observations, the sample firms earn an average cumulative three-year return of 33.11 percent, while their controls exhibit a cumulative three-year return of -5.4 percent. The difference in performance is significant at the 1 percent level, using both parametric and nonparametric tests.
The use of all available observations implies that the sample size diminishes as we move further away from the announcement, for two reasons. First, some firms are delisted. Second, the data for events occurring after 1994 are truncated at December 1998 (when our CRSP data end). As an alternative measure of long-term performance, we also examine only those companies for which we have 36 months of data. This procedure reduces the sample size to 112 pairs of firms. The 112 sample firms have a three-year cumulative return of 68.83 percent, while their controls return 22.60 percent. This difference is significant at the 1 percent level, using both parametric and nonparametric tests.
These long-run performance measures reinforce the conclusion that the proceeds from the warrant exercise are not squandered.
Summary and conclusions
This paper examines 267 announcements of the "sweetening" of warrants, i.e., discretionary reductions in their exercise prices. The sample firms are typically small, young, derive much of their value from growth options, and are experiencing poor operating performance. As a result, they are subject to significant information asymmetry and potential agency conflict, each of which may hinder the equity issuance process.
Our primary contribution is to provide evidence that the managerial discretion to lower warrant exercise price is an efficacious provision of the warrant agreement, in spite of concern 19 about the potential for squandering of the incremental capital. This evidence is as follows. First, the two-day stock price reaction to the reduction announcements is -1.33 percent, appreciably smaller than the stock price decline associated with other types of equity financing announcements. Second, firms that provide information about the use of the proceeds experience a stock price reaction that is marginally positive. Third, the sample firms survive at roughly the same rate as their controls in spite of their younger age, and significantly outperform their controls over the following three-year period.
This evidence suggests that there are not material conflicts between shareholders and warrantholders, and that the costs of potential shareholder-manager agency conflicts are outweighed by the benefits of managerial flexibility. The small stock price decline in response to the use of this flexibility lends doubt to the agency-cost explanation for warrants. Overall, we interpret the results as consistent with warrants as efficient contracts that facilitate the equity financing process for these firms at a time when other avenues of financing are not available or are prohibitively expensive. +Median is significantly different from the median of the sample of temporary reductions at the 5 percent level. There are no significant differences in means for any of the variables. Significantly different from the mean of the temporary reductions sample at the 1% level. **Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. Table 5 Abnormal returns of common stock around the announcement of a reduction in warrant exercise price For each event day, the table reports the average abnormal return (in percent) of the common stocks of firms that announced a reduction of warrant exercise price on day 0. Tests of significance use the Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) t-statistic. Abnormal returns are estimated using the market model with parameters estimated from day -120 to day -10. The CRSP Nasdaq index serves as the market proxy. **Significant at the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. Table 6 Cross-sectional variation in stock price reaction Panel A. Correlation of CAR(-1,0) with other variables
The table shows the correlation of the two-day cumulative abnormal return, CAR(-1,0), with RSD, the standard deviation of market model residuals from the estimation period; MTOB, the market-to-book ratio; EQUITY, the market value of equity; %INFLOW, the dollar inflow from warrant exercise expressed as a percent of market value of equity; and REDUCE, the percent reduction in exercise price. Sample sizes shown in brackets.
Correlation of CAR(-1,0) with: Combined sample 
